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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last two decades, those at the bottom of the income scale have seen their 
incomes stagnate, while those at the top have seen theirs skyrocket. Without intervention, 
the recession that began in December 2007 was likely to exacerbate this trend. Will the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) be able to keep the situation 
from getting worse for those at the bottom of the income scale? Will ARRA reverse the 
upward trend in inequality that we have seen in the recent past? We employ a 
microsimulation of ARRA to address these questions. We find that, despite a large 
amount of job creation, ARRA is likely to have little impact on overall income inequality, 
or on the income gaps between relatively advantaged and disadvantaged groups. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The first decade of the new millennium is likely to be the worst decade in terms of 
employment and output growth in the United States since the end of the Second World 
War. Even ignoring the sharp contraction that occurred in the last two quarters, growth in 
output and employment during the 2000s has averaged at levels much lower than what 
was observed since the 1950s (see figure 1).  














































Notes: The numbers are averages of quarterly growth rates from 1950:1 to 2009:1. Employment refers to 
total nonfarm employment (seasonally adjusted). Growth rates in real GDP are seasonally adjusted at 
annual rates. The data points labeled “2000s(1)” exclude the data for last two quarters.                                                              
Source: Authors’ calculations from BEA and BLS data. 
 
 
The growth in the average wage also has been slower in the current decade as 
compared to the 1990s, as well as the two decades immediately following the Second 
World War. As we know, inequality in wage income was considerably higher during the   3
last two decades compared to the 1970s and 1980s. Hence, the faster growth in the 
average wage during the later period was driven, to a large extent, by the big gains made 
by those at the higher rungs of the wage distribution. For the population as a whole, 
median family money income is a better indicator of economic well-being than the 
average wage. Similar to the trends in output and employment, trends in median family 
money income also point to the 2000s as the decade of worst performance since the 
Second World War (figure 2). However, the deterioration in the average growth rate 
appears to be much more drastic for median family income than for output or 
employment. 
 























Notes: The numbers are averages of annual growth rates from 1950 to 2007. Average wage is the wage and 
salary accruals per full-time equivalent employee deflated by the price index for private consumption 
expenditures. Median family income is median income in current dollars deflated by the CPI-U (RS). 
Sources: Authors’ calculations from BEA, BLS, and Census data. 
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The evidence presented above suggests that economic performance in terms of 
growth in output, employment, wages, and family income was generally poorer in the 
2000s, even before the onset of the financial crisis from September 2008. The financial 
crisis and the accompanying global slump constitute the greatest threat to restoring 
growth rates of wages and family income to their levels in the 1990s. However, such a 
restoration is unlikely to emerge without a set of coherent macroeconomic and labor 
market policies that go beyond merely addressing the financial crisis and recession. 
The administration of President Barack Obama inherited an economic mess that 
was quickly transforming into a deep economic malaise when it took office on January 
20, 2009. With remarkable speed, the administration managed to sign into law a package 
of spending increases and tax cuts known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (ARRA) on February 19, 2009. According to the administration, the Act will create 
or save approximately 3.5 million jobs by the end of 2010. The transfers and tax cuts 
included in the Act are expected to provide relief to low-income and vulnerable 
households especially hurt by the economic crisis and, at the same time, support 
aggregate demand. Apart from playing the role of macroeconomic stabilization, the Act, 
in the words of the administration’s recovery website, “will lay the foundation for a 
robust and sustainable 21st century economy” by “modernizing our health care, 
improving our schools, modernizing our infrastructure, and investing in the clean energy 
technologies of the future.”
1  
Our aim is to provide a preliminary assessment of the Act in terms of its likely 
impact on median household income, gaps between advantaged and disadvantaged 
population subgroups, and income inequality. A central motivation for evaluating the Act 
from this particular standpoint was articulated quite poignantly by President Obama 
himself in his historic inauguration speech: “The success of our economy has always 
depended not just on the size of our gross domestic product, but on the reach of our 
prosperity; on the ability to extend opportunity to every willing heart—not out of charity, 
but because it is the surest route to our common good.”
2  
                                                 
1 See http://www.recovery.gov/?q=content/our-mission. Accessed on April 24, 2009. 
2 Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/. Accessed on April 24, 2009.   5
The preliminary and tentative character of the exercise cannot be emphasized 
enough. Only a small fraction of the total appropriations made under the Act has actually 
been spent so far. The specific purposes for which different levels and agencies of 
government will spend substantial chunks of the monies are still to be determined. There 
is also uncertainty regarding the manner (i.e., in the form of loans or grants) in which a 
considerable portion of the money will be spent. The “known unknowns” about the Act 
itself impose a sizeable degree of tentativeness to any evaluation. In addition, the 
methods and data utilized in conducting our assessment are also bound to change in the 
future as we refine our methods and better information becomes available. Admittedly, 
there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the construction of most future economic 




Our strategy toward assessing the implications of the Act consists of three main steps: 
constructing a baseline scenario; estimating the increase in employment by industry and 
occupation due to ARRA; and simulating the accompanying effects of changes in 
earnings on the distribution of money income.
3 
In the first step, we constructed a baseline scenario of labor market conditions and 
distribution of income against which the effects of the Act can be assessed. Given that the 
main objectives of our study are related to the level and distribution of income, we 
adopted the latest Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC 2008) as the basic 
sample. The main drawback of the sample is that it reflects the income situation and labor 
market experience of individuals in 2007. To overcome this difficulty, we imputed labor 
force status in January 2009 and total income for the year 2008 for all civilian adults 16 
years and older. Admittedly, imputation processes have their hazards, yet it is better than 
assuming as a baseline a sample that does not reflect the steep rise in joblessness during 
2008 and the accompanying changes in earnings. The imputation process consisted of 
four major parts.  
                                                 
3 The details of the sources and methods of our model will be available in Zacharias, Masterson, and Kim 
(forthcoming).   6
First, labor force categories were imputed within the ASEC 2008 data set. The 
method involved using the January 2009 CPS to run selection models for labor force 
participation, employment status, and full-time status, then predicting status in the ASEC. 
The predicted propensities were used to assign status to individuals, within cells 
constructed with industry, age, and sex. Second, the unemployed in the resulting data set 
were statistically matched with the January unemployed to transfer the duration of 
unemployment. The resulting data set was then augmented with income packages in three 
stages. In the first, earnings were multiply imputed using hot-decking for the labor force 
and chained equations for those not in the labor force. In the second stage, unemployment 
compensation, workmen’s compensation, and disability payments were imputed using 
hot-decking with the results of the previous steps. In the third stage, means-tested 
transfers were imputed for families using hot-decking with the results of the prior steps. 
Other sources of income were carried over without change from 2007 to 2008. Finally, all 
components of money income were “aged” according to external data for each 
component (e.g., unemployment compensation for each recipient was “aged” by using the 
percent change in unemployment compensation per beneficiary by region, calculated 
from the administrative data). The resulting baseline scenario is a multiply imputed 
dataset with complete labor force characteristics and income profiles for 2008. 
Once the baseline scenario was constructed, we turned to confront the issues of 
estimating the effects of ARRA on income distribution, relative to the baseline scenario. 
The only channel of influence that we consider here is the creation of new employment 
due to ARRA and the attendant effects on earnings, which, in turn, shapes total income 
(earnings plus all other money income).
4 Our approach may be described as 
“comparative-static” since we do not at all take into account how other changes in the 
economic environment would affect employment and income distribution in the current 
and future years. Therefore, our simulated effects of ARRA represent a “best-case 
scenario” for employment, since labor market conditions have worsened notably so far in 
                                                 
4 The definition of money income used in this report is the standard Census Bureau definition: the sum of 
pre-tax cash income from all sources, excluding capital gains and losses.   7
2009 and most forecasts call for a relatively high unemployment rate during the next few 
years.
5 
Estimating the employment effects require us to identify the appropriate amount 
of fiscal stimulus (i.e., net addition to final demand) imparted by the Act. Our starting 
point was the CBO estimates of the budgetary costs of the Act over the period 2009–2019 
(table 1). We made three adjustments to derive an appropriate amount of fiscal stimulus 
from the CBO cost estimates. First, we excluded the amounts explicitly set aside in the 
Act toward compensating for the expected cutbacks in state and local government 
spending because they do not constitute a net injection of additional aggregate demand. 
The amounts excluded were the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund and State Fiscal Relief. 
They constitute roughly 18.2 percent of the total budgetary cost over the period 2009–
2019.
6 However, since many economists (including the Council of Economic Advisors) 
include some of these amounts in their assessments, we present our results with the 













                                                 
5 For example, according to the March 2009 projection of the CBO, the unemployment rate will not fall 
below the 2008 level of 5.8 percent until 2013, even after taking into account the effects of ARRA. The 
administration forecasts the same year in its FY2010 budget, while the so-called “Blue Chip Consensus” 
forecasts 2015 (Congressional Budget Office 2009). 
6 While the amount set aside in ARRA will help to offset that reduction, it appears that the expected 
reduction in state budgets during the period 2009–2011 is much higher, at $350 to $370 billion (Johnson, 
Oliff, and Koulish 2009).   8
Table 1. Derivation of the Fiscal Stimulus from the ARRA over the Period 2009–
2011 (in millions) 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CBO (2009). 
Notes: (1) Consists mainly of grants for preventing cutbacks in state and local education expenditures. (2) 
Consists mostly of grants for Medicaid. (3) Consists of all direct loans and loan guarantees, and some 
subsidies such as health information-technology incentive payments. (4) Consists mostly of outlays on 
discretionary spending scheduled after 2011 in Division A of the Act, as estimated by CBO. 
 
 
The other two adjustments reflected considerations with respect to coverage and 
timing. We excluded some items that could not be considered (at least in a national 
accounting sense) as adding to aggregate demand (e.g., loans) and some items that could 
not be assigned appropriate multiplier effects (e.g., subsidies for information-technology 
improvements in healthcare). Finally, in order to focus on the near-term effects, we 
excluded budgetary costs that the CBO considered to be incurred only beyond 2011. The 
two adjustments due to coverage and timing differences reduced the CBO estimate of 
budgetary cost by 14.3 percent.  
The fiscal stimulus was split among three main categories for the estimation of 
employment effects (table 2). Following the conventional method, the impact of tax cuts, 
transfers, and subsidies on GDP were calculated using a set of multipliers that convert an 
additional dollar of government expenditure (or tax cut) into an increase in GDP.
7 For 
each tax cut and transfer, the CBO specifies the range of values for the multiplier (“low” 
and “high” values). We performed estimation using the high value and the midpoint of 
                                                 
7 There is a great deal of controversy about the “appropriate” value of multipliers that fundamentally reflect 
deep-rooted differences among macroeconomic theories. For the administration’s approach, see Romer and 
Bernstein (2009) and Council of Economic Advisors (2009). Cogan et al. (2009) advanced an opposing 
view (with very low multiplier values). 
Amount Percent
Total Budgetary Cost, 2009-2019 787,242 100.0%
Less: Compensating for expected reductions in the 
contribution to aggregate demand by state and local 
governments 143,642 18.2%
State Fiscal Stabilization Fund 53,600 6.8%
State Fiscal Relief 90,042 11.4%
Less: coverage differences 61,108 7.8%
Less: timing differences (adjustments for budgetary costs 
during 2012-2019): 51,528 6.5%
Equals:
Fiscal Stimulus for Employment Estimates, 2009-2011 530,964 67.4%  9
the range as alternative values for the multiplier (CBO 2009). The resulting increase in 
aggregate GDP was distributed among the major industries according to their GDP shares 
in 2006. In the next step, using the employment-GDP ratios in 2006, the increases in 
GDP by industry were translated into increases in employment by industry.
8 
 






Purchases of goods and services 119,519 22.5%
Transfers to persons and subsidies
1 121,857 23.0%
Tax cuts 289,588 54.5%
TOTAL 530,964 100.0%  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: (1) The subsidies amount to 0.75 percent of total outlays 
 
 
A different method, based on input-output analysis, was adopted for estimating 
the employment effect of government purchases of goods and services. The increase in 
government purchases was distributed across the final demand for the products of the 201 
industries in the 2006 input-output table. We employed two alternative assumptions about 
the distribution of the increase in final demand across industries. Under one assumption, 
which reflects current input-output and national accounting conventions, the increase is 
distributed among the government industries in the table.
9 Below, we refer to this 
assumption as the “government” assumption. The alternative assumption involves 
distributing the increase in final demand across government and private industries, with 
the latter capturing most of the increase and government industries receiving only outlays 
                                                 
8 We are assuming here that increase in final demand will be met by increase in the number of persons 
employed and not by increase in the hours worked by existing workers and/or increase in productivity. 
Since productivity is generally considered to be procyclical (Basu and Fernald 2001), our assumption may 
be viewed as being biased toward a higher estimate of job creation; however, since economic activity 
during several quarters of the period of projection is likely to remain moribund, the bias may not be 
considerable. 
9 They are: federal government defense; federal government non-defense (except enterprises); local 
government enterprises except passenger transit; local government hospitals; local government educational 
services; local government excluding enterprises, educational services, and hospitals; state government 
enterprises; state government hospitals; state government educational services; and state government 
excluding enterprises, educational services, and hospitals.   10
that are destined for tasks that, under the current institutional arrangements, are 
essentially performed by government bodies. This assumption, called the “private” 
assumption, reflects the older national accounting view that government is solely a 
consumer, rather than the current view that regards government as a consumer and 
producer.
10 
In input-output analysis, the employment multiplier matrix provides the link 
between increase in final demand and employment. The matrix shows direct and indirect 
impacts of changes in final demand on employment due to inter-industry linkages. For 
instance, final demand increase on construction translates into increasing demand for 
inputs produced by other industries in the economy and, in turn, raises labor demand for 
both construction and input suppliers. In this exercise, the fiscal stimulus generates an 
initial, direct boost of final demand for goods and services produced by industries 
classified under two different assumptions. Indirect impacts follow via inter-industry 
transactions of intermediate inputs. To account for the domestic employment impact of 
the Act, we exclude job impacts on the foreign economy from which some of the inputs 
are imported. 
The employment estimates generated by the conventional and input-output 
methods were combined to form the total additional employment resulting from the 
stimulus in each industry. It is reasonable to expect that the employment effects will vary 
not just across industries, but also across occupations. We assumed that the additional 
employment created by the ARRA would be split across occupations in each industry in 
the same proportions that it was split in 2006. The latter proportions were taken from the 
occupation-industry matrix created by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
In the final step, we assumed that the additional demand for labor created by the 
stimulus would be met by an increased supply of labor from the pool of “employable” 
individuals in the ASEC. The employable pool consisted of individuals (16 years and 
older) who were deemed to be currently (that is, as of January 2009) not working. 
Additionally, we excluded individuals who did not work at all in 2007 and gave the 
                                                 
10 For example, expenditures on research conducted by the National Institute for Health are classified as 
boosting the final demand for “scientific research and development services (BLS sector number 134)” 
under the “private” assumption and “federal non-defense government except enterprises (BLS sector 
number 184)” under the “government” assumption.   11
reason for not working as being retired, ill, disabled, taking care of family, or, for those 
under twenty years of age, in school. 
For each of the scenarios, the newly created jobs were distributed by industry and 
occupation. In order to accomplish the assignment, we created a ranking for each 
individual of occupations and industries by likelihood of being employed in each. The 
method was to estimate a multinomial probit regression for industry and occupation and 
then predict probabilities for each.
11 For each individual, industries and occupations were 
ranked based on highest propensity. Then we estimated likelihood of being employed for 
each individual, using a probit procedure.
12 With these three sets of information for each 
individual, we assigned employment status to those not already employed in the baseline 
scenario using an iterative procedure, stepping through industry and occupation pairs, 
selecting those most likely to be employed from among those most likely to be employed 
in that industry-occupation pair, until all the available jobs are assigned. Once we have 
assigned jobs, we reassign earnings to those individuals who received a new job. Once 
again, the method is hot-decking. Other components of money income remain unchanged 




We begin by discussing job creation under ARRA. Then, estimates of the new jobs 
among industries, occupations, and demographic groups are presented. Finally, we turn to 
the likely impact of the additional employment on median household income, income 
disparities among population subgroups, and income inequality. 
 
A. Estimates of Job Creation 
As discussed before, we estimated the potential additional employment from the stimulus 
under two sets of values for the multipliers for transfers, taxes, and subsidies (“high” and 
“medium”), and under two assumptions regarding the industrial distribution of final 
                                                 
11 Independent variables for the industry and occupation multinomial logits were census division, 
metropolitan status, age, marital status, sex, educational attainment, and race. 
12  Independent variables for the employment probit were census division, metropolitan status, age, age 
squared, marital status, sex, educational attainment, and race.   12
demand generated by government purchases (“government” and “private”). The 
combination of assumptions produces four scenarios. Our estimates of new jobs are 
shown in figure 3, along with the estimates by the CBO and the Council of Economic 
Advisors (CEA). 
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Source: Authors’ estimates, CBO (2009), Council of Economic Advisors (2009), and BLS. 
 
 
It is a remarkable coincidence that the estimates of new jobs under our “medium” 
scenarios are nearly identical to the estimate by the administration. In our view, this 
finding casts considerable cloud over the charge made by Cogan et al. (2009) that the 
administration’s estimates are not robust. We used a substantially different methodology 
and set of assumptions to derive our results, yet the additional employment resulting from 
two of our scenarios is indistinguishable from the administration’s estimate. Of course,   13
this congruence is no guarantee that the “reality” is more likely to match the scenario.
13 
Furthermore, even with the potential of an additional 6.2 million jobs over 2009–2011, it 
is sobering to note that total employment has already fallen by 6.5 million between the 
start of the recession in December 2007 and March 2009 (according to the monthly CPS 
figures).
14 Given that a sizeable decline in employment is likely to occur during the 
period of projection, even the potential employment from our “high” scenario estimates 
(8.6 to 8.8 million) or that of the CBO (7.7 million) will largely have a palliative, rather 




















                                                 
13 We place the word “reality” in quotes because the additional employment created by the ARRA cannot 
be calculated precisely, even in the future. While the direct employment effect can be quantified post 
factum, indirect employment due to the backward linkages generated by additional final demand from 
government purchases, as well as the employment effects generated by tax cuts and transfers, will 
necessarily have to be estimated from economic models. 
14 Estimates are based on seasonally unadjusted monthly figures.   14




















Notes: (1) The numbers refer to average percent change over the preceding year. (2) Employment refers to 
employment of persons 16 years and older. Population growth is shown for prime-age workers (age 25 to 
64 years). (3) The data for employment during the 2000s include estimates of employment for 2009–2011. 
The latter were obtained by adding our estimate of ARRA employment under the “government-medium” 
assumption to the CBO baseline estimate of employment. (4) The data for the population during the 2000s 
include estimates for 2009–2011. They were obtained by extrapolation using the annual average growth 
rate during 2008–2010 for 2009 and 2010; the growth rate during 2010–2015 was used for deriving the 
2011 estimate. 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Census Bureau data. 
 
 
While the ameliorating effect of the stimulus plan on the employment situation is 
surely welcome, it appears that the government could have achieved more at the same 
cost. As shown in table 2, roughly 55 percent of the fiscal stimulus over the period 2009–
2011 will be delivered via tax cuts. In accordance with the general macroeconomic 
consensus, we found that the amount of stimulus required per new job created was much 
higher for taxes than outlays under all scenarios. Each additional job would cost 
approximately $69,000 in tax cuts versus $52,000 in spending increases in the “medium” 
scenarios and $110,000 versus $69,000 in the “high” scenarios.   15
B. Job Creation by Industry, Occupation, and Demographic Characteristics 
The industrial composition of the additional employment under alternative assumptions 
regarding the industrial distribution of final demand is shown in table 3.
15 As one would 
expect, the most notable difference is the much lower share of government employment 
under the “private” assumption compared to the “government” assumption (19.2 versus 
28.8 percent). The much higher share of construction (9.5 versus 5.4 percent) 
accompanies the lower share of government under the “private” assumption. In turn, this 
reflects the substantial investments made in the stimulus package for improving the 
nation’s infrastructure and structures under public ownership or control. Smaller 
increases, relative to the “government” assumption, can also be observed for the shares of 
the education and health services, as well as professional and business services.
16 Under 
both assumptions, the government sector will be the largest employer,
17 followed by 











                                                 
15 Our estimates of industrial composition did not change much in response to assumptions about the values 
of the multipliers. 
16 Education and health services industry also include the social assistance industry. It should be noted that 
under both assumptions public education was treated as a part of government production. The higher share 
of employment in this industry under the private assumption is partly due to the fact the final demand 
assigned is higher by $9.3 billion. Community block grants for child development, public housing support, 
and employment and training services are included in the relevant industries (education and social 
assistance) under the private assumption. However, under the government assumption, the items are 
assigned to general government. In addition, the direct job impact is greater than the indirect impact by 
approximately three to one. Combining these two aspects leads to higher job creation in the sectors under 
the private assumption. 
17 State and local government would account for 82 to 90 percent of the jobs created in the government 
sector.   16
Table 3. Industrial Composition of ARRA Employment (in percent) 
Note: Employment effects reported in the table were calculated with “medium” values for multipliers (see 
note 12). 
Source: Author’s calculations; Romer and Bernstein (2009). 
 
 
For the sake of comparison, we also report the estimates from Romer and 
Bernstein (2009), with the caveat that the latter estimates pertain to jobs created by the 
last quarter of 2010, whereas our estimates also include 2011. The methodology used by 
Romer and Bernstein to obtain the shares of individual industries is not clearly spelled 
out in their paper. This difficulty, along with the difference in the time horizon, rules out 
an adequate explanation for the differences in the estimates. Nevertheless, it is of note 
that the estimated share of government employment is only 6.6 percent in their model, 
which is far lower than under our “private” assumption regarding final demand (19.2), 
and the actual share of government employment in 2007 (14.3). In contrast, Romer and 
Bernstein estimate the shares of construction, retail trade, and leisure and hospitality to be 
far higher than us. It is not obvious why such a large proportion of employment created 
by ARRA should fall in the latter two industries. 
We estimate that the additional employment generated by ARRA would favor 
blue-collar and low-end service occupations relative to other occupations (table 4). As 
discussed before, we did not estimate separately the occupation mix of each industry in 
our simulation of ARRA. Hence, the occupational composition of ARRA employment is 
Government Private
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 1.2 1.3 0.0
Mining 0.4 0.4 0.7
Construction  5.4 9.5 18.4
Manufacturing – Total  8.3 8.7 11.1
Wholesale Trade  3.5 3.5 4.3
Retail Trade  8.6 8.8 16.4
Information 1.9 2.0 1.4
Financial Activities  5.3 5.2 5.8
Professional and Business Services  11.5 13.3 9.4
Education and Health Services  10.3 13.4 6.5
Leisure and Hospitality  7.6 7.4 13.6
Other Services 4.0 3.9 2.7
Utilities 0.4 0.4 0.3
Transportation and Warehousing 2.9 3.0 2.7
Government – Total  28.8 19.2 6.6
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0
Levy Romer and 
Bernstein (2009) Industry  17
purely a consequence of the estimated industrial distribution of additional employment. 
The occupations favored by ARRA pay, on the average, wages that are considerably 
below the wages in the other occupations. Compared to the average weekly earnings of 
workers in blue-collar occupations, those in managerial, professional, and high-end 
service occupations earned, respectively, 79, 67, and 11 percent more in 2008. A similar 
comparison for low-end service workers show that the gaps were even higher: employees 
in managerial, professional, and high-end service occupations earned, respectively, 120, 
106, and 36 percent more in average weekly earnings in 2008.
18 We can, therefore, 
expect the additional employment created by the ARRA to benefit workers on the bottom 
rungs of the earnings distribution—an outcome that could have a favorable effect on the 
distribution of household money income, as we discuss later.  
 
 
Table 4. Occupational Composition of Baseline and ARRA Employment (in percent) 
Note: Occupational effects reported in the table were calculated with “medium” values for multipliers. 
 “Managers” include “management, business, and financial” occupations. “Professionals” include 
“computer and mathematical science; architecture and engineering; life, physical, and social science; legal; 
and, healthcare practitioner and technical” occupations. “High-end” services include “community and 
social service; education, training, and library; arts, design, and entertainment; and healthcare support” 
occupations. “Low-end” services include “protective service; food preparation and serving; building and 
grounds cleaning and maintenance; personal care and service; sales and related; and office and 
administrative support” occupations. “Production” include “farming, fishing, and forestry; construction and 
extraction; installation, maintenance, and repair; production; and transportation and material moving” 
occupations. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
                                                 
18 We calculated weekly earnings by occupational groups from the monthly outgoing rotations of the 2008 
CPS. 
Occupation
Baseline Government  Private
Manager 15.0 10.4 9.8
Professional 12.3 11.7 11.5
High End Service 12.6 8.3 8.6
Low End Service 40.9 46.0 43.3
Production 19.2 23.5 26.8
All 100.0 100.0 100.0
Assumption about Final 
Demand  18
Our simulation model allowed us to estimate the demographic composition of 
ARRA employment (table 5).
19 As we discussed before, the model assigned 
“employable” individuals in the sample to the industry-occupation cells formed by the 
combination of occupations shown in table 4 and a slightly more elaborate list of 
industries shown in table 3. Demographic characteristics of individuals played a crucial 
role in placing an individual in a particular cell. Our results indicate that, relative to the 
baseline, ARRA employment is likely to be more male than female, more black and 
Asian than white or Asian, more college-educated than not college educated, and more 
likely to be older than 60 than under 60. 
 




The pool from which we selected job recipients consisted of those individuals 
who were not employed in the baseline, with the exception of all those who were listed as 
not working because they were disabled, retired, homemakers, or in school in 2007. Of 
those reporting in-school status, only those under the age of twenty were left out of the 
                                                 
19 We present all four scenarios in this case because, unlike our estimates of industrial and occupational 
composition, the estimates of demographic composition proved to be somewhat sensitive to the value of the 
multipliers. 
Category Baseline High Medium High Medium
A. Sex
Male 52.4 57.1 59.8 59.7 63.0
Female 47.6 42.9 40.2 40.3 37.0
B. Race/Ethnicity
White 69.3 63.2 60.5 63.1 60.7
Nonwhite 30.7 36.8 39.5 36.9 39.3
C. Education
Less than High School 9.8 4.7 3.6 5.5 4.4
High School Graduate 27.7 22.1 21.1 24.8 22.0
Some College 29.5 35.2 36.5 35.8 36.4
College Graduate 32.9 37.9 38.8 33.8 37.3
D. Age
Less than 25 12.9 11.5 9.9 11.6 11.5
25 to 60 79.2 74.9 76.9 76.2 80.8
Greater than 60 8.0 13.6 13.2 12.2 7.6
Government Private
Additional ARRA Employment  19
pool. In the resulting pool of over 28 million potential workers, 54.2 percent were male. 
Thus, in our assignment, males were likelier than females to be selected for job 
recipiency. The racial composition of our pool was 62.4 percent white and 37.6 percent 
nonwhite. Whites were more likely to be selected in the “high” scenarios than their 
presence in the pool would indicate and less likely in the “medium” scenarios. The 
opposite is true for nonwhites. In terms of educational attainment, 21.9 percent of the 
pool had less than a high school diploma, 32.6 percent were high school graduates, and 
30.7 percent had some college, while 14.9 percent were college graduates. Thus, those 
with a high school degree or less were much less likely to be job gainers in any scenario 
than their presence in the pool would indicate, while those with at least some college 
were more likely. Finally, in terms of age, those less than 25 were less likely, while those 
over 60 were more likely, and those of prime age were much more likely to be job 
recipients than their respective shares of the pool would indicate. In sum, we can say that, 
compared to their shares in the employable pool, the stimulus favors men over women, 
the college educated over those without any college, and prime age over younger 
workers. 
Romer and Bernstein estimated that the share of female employment in total 
ARRA employment was approximately 42 percent (Romer and Bernstein 2009). They 
derived this result by multiplying the ARRA employment in each industry by the share of 
women in total employment in 2008, adding up the resulting count of female jobs across 
industries, and then dividing the total number of ARRA jobs going to women by the total 
ARRA employment. We estimate the share of women in ARRA employment to be 
generally lower, with the exception of one scenario. Romer and Bernstein argue that the 
stimulus jobs package could be considered as somewhat skewed toward women because 
their share in ARRA employment is much higher than their share in the job losses since 
the onset of the current recession. Although it is important to examine whether the 
stimulus program is creating jobs for those hit hardest by the recession, from an equity 
standpoint it is also imperative to compare the demographic composition of ARRA   20
employment against the composition of the employable pool of individuals or 
composition of employment without ARRA.
20 
The importance of scrutinizing the equity aspects of the employment creation 
under ARRA using both different yardsticks becomes clearer when we consider that they 
can produce opposite results. Estimates are shown in table 6 for the demographic 
composition of employment in December 2007 (the start of current recession), job losses 
incurred between then and March 2009, and our estimate of ARRA employment under 
the “government-medium” scenario [columns (1) through (3)].  
 
Table 6. Job Losses versus Job Creation, by Demographic Groups (in percent) 
Note: The zeros in column (4) indicate numbers between minus 0.01 percent and plus 0.01 percent. 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
The yardstick employed by Romer and Bernstein would suggest that the job 
creation by ARRA is skewed toward females, nonwhites, and those who attended or 
graduated from college. However, if we use the shares in December 2007 as the 
benchmark, we would reach the same conclusion only for the last mentioned group. 
                                                 
20 Consider, for example, a society with two mutually exclusive groups, one of which is completely 
excluded from employment due to discrimination. If a government program to combat job losses created 
jobs only for those who were employed previously, then it would reinforce the existing system of 
discrimination. 
(1) (2) (3)
Category December 2007 Job Losses ARRA
A. Sex
Male 53.3 73.5 59.8 -0.02
Female 46.7 26.5 40.2 0.01
B. Race/Ethnicity
White 69.0 64.6 60.5 -0.01
Black 10.5 13.5 15.0 0.00
Hispanic 14.0 16.1 11.9 -0.02
Other 6.5 5.8 12.5 0.04
C. Education
Less than High School 10.6 28.3 3.6 -0.10
High School Graduate 29.3 51.6 21.1 -0.05
Some College 28.8 15.3 36.5 0.03
College Graduate 31.3 4.7 38.8 0.04






Females and nonwhites now appear to be somewhat disadvantaged under ARRA. By 
either standard, the picture for those who have not attended college appears to be 
particularly bleak. They made up about 40 percent of total employment at the start of the 
recession and accounted for 80 percent of job losses, yet their share of ARRA 
employment is likely to be less than 25 percent. Those who have attended or graduated 
from college appear poised to appropriate the bulk of new jobs created. In light of our 
discussion of the estimated occupational composition of ARRA employment (table 4), it 
may very well be the case that a significant proportion of them would end up in relatively 
low-paying and low-skilled jobs. 
The final column in the table shows the difference between jobs created under 
ARRA and jobs lost in the recession until March 2009 as a percentage of the level of 
employment in December 2007. It is worth emphasizing that the estimates in the column 
are constructed by ignoring job losses that have happened since April 2009 and job losses 
that are expected to persist for some time. They also assume the additional employment 
from the stimulus is created instantaneously. 
We already pointed out that the job losses from the onset of the recession until 
March 2009 exceed the administration’s estimates of job creation due to ARRA and our 
estimate under two scenarios (figure 3). However, there appears to be some differences 
among groups. The jobs created for women are likely to be more than the jobs they have 
lost so far in the current recession and, consequently, their resulting level of employment 
will be slightly higher than at the start of the recession as a result of ARRA. Among the 
racial groups, whites lose ground in employment relative to the start of the recession even 
with the ARRA, while nonwhites make no significant gain. Individuals who have not 
graduated from high school will suffer the largest loss, even after accounting for the 
employment gains from ARRA, followed by those with just a high school degree. 
 
C. Effects on Earnings and Household Income 
In this section we focus on the scenario that resulted in an estimate of the aggregate 
employment effect that was closest to the estimate of the administration (approximately 
6.2 million new jobs). This scenario was described earlier as the “government-medium” 
scenario (see figure 1), reflecting the assumptions made regarding the industrial   22
distribution of additional final demand generated by government purchases and the 
values of multipliers attached to transfers and taxes. As discussed in the methodology 
section, once we assigned the ARRA jobs to the employable pool of individuals, we also 
estimated their annual earnings. The annual earnings of the newly employed individuals 
were added to the annual incomes of other individuals in the household to obtain the new 
level of household income.
21 
Our estimates suggest that the average annual earnings for individuals employed 
in the ARRA jobs are likely to be higher than the baseline earnings (i.e., annual earnings 
of earners in non-ARRA jobs) by about 3 percent. Combining both groups of earners 
produces a level of earnings that is 0.7 percent higher than the baseline (table 7, the last 
entry under the column “with ARRA employment”). Turning to earners in different 
subgroups, the most striking increase is for workers in the bottom quintile of the earnings 
distribution. The average earnings in the bottom quintile of the ARRA earnings 
distribution are estimated to be 11.9 percent higher than the baseline bottom quintile. 
Caution in interpreting this number is advised, however. The baseline bottom quintile 
contains a significant number of individuals with negative earnings, while this is not true 
for the individuals added to the bottom earnings quintile as a result of ARRA job 
recipiency. We can see, in general, that the effect of the ARRA is to raise the lower end 
of the earnings distribution. In addition, average earnings for women increase a bit more 
than for men, although this increase is small compared to the earnings gap. The same can 
be said of the ARRA’s impact on the white/nonwhite earnings gap. Finally, the ARRA 
seems to be a greater gain for those who are high school, but not college, graduates, 
although this boost will do little to shrink the gap between these groups and college 
graduates. 
                                                 
21 We assume that there will be no new households, i.e., the newly employed individuals continue to live in 
their current households.   23
Table 7. Average Annual Earnings, Baseline and Government-medium Scenario 
Note: The estimates are for all earners with positive and negative earnings. 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
We next turn to our estimates of median household income (figure 5). The peak of 
the real household money income series between 1967 and 2007 occurred in 1999, at 
approximately $52,800 (in 2008 dollars), which we have set equal to 100 in the figure. 
The values for the other years are expressed as a percentage of the 1999 level. Our 
estimates for 2008 and 2008 with ARRA effects are shown by the bars labeled, 
respectively, “2008” and “2008-ARRA.” We find that median household income is likely 
to decline in 2008 by 1.5 percent. The comparative-static effect of the ARRA on 
household income is estimated to slightly more than offset that decline. If it were to 
materialize, the level of income would still be lower than what the average household 
received in 1999 and 2000, but it might represent a softening of the blow delivered on the 
middle class by the current economic crisis. 
The administration has estimated that the likely impact of the ARRA will be to 
boost the average money income of the middle quintile of working age families
22 by 2.3 
                                                 









Less than High School 18,491 0.2
High School Graduate 31,499 1.2
Some College 35,720 1.1







All earners 42,271 0.7
Baseline 
(2008)
Percent Change from 
Baseline with ARRA 
Employment  24
percent (Middle Class Task Force 2009). This estimate was obtained by projecting the 
impact of the expected decline in unemployment due to ARRA on to family income. The 
actual relationship used was based on the results of a regression analysis conducted in the 
early 1990s based on CPS data from 1967 to 1991 (Blank and Card 1993). Our own 
estimates for the same group of families, however, show a much more modest gain of 1.8 
percent. 
 









1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008-ARRA
 
Notes: “Baseline” refers to our estimate for 2008; “2008-ARRA” represents the baseline revised to include 
the effects of ARRA. 
Source: The estimates for 2008 and 2008-ARRA are authors’ estimates. The data for the remaining years 
are from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
 
We also found that the percentage gain in average income will be higher for the 
lower quintiles than the higher quintiles when we incorporate the effects of ARRA 
(figure 6). This is consistent with our findings regarding average earnings across the 
earnings quintiles. The outcome is partly an arithmetical artifact since the average income 
is, by definition, lower for the lower quintiles so that a higher percentage increase can   25
still mean a smaller increase in absolute terms.
23 However, when compared against the 
change in mean income by quintile between 1999 and 2008, it appears that the gains from 
ARRA are distributed in a pro-poor fashion. The pro-poor pattern of income growth that 
could result from ARRA is expected to have only a negligible effect on the shares of 
aggregate income going toward each quintile. This might be an indication of the likely 
effect of ARRA on overall inequality in money income—very little (figure 7). 
 
Figure 6. Change in Mean Income by Quintile (in percent), 1999 to 2007 (left-axis) 
and Baseline to with ARRA (right-axis) 
 
Notes: “2008-ARRA” represents the baseline revised to include the effects of ARRA. 













                                                 
23 For example, the absolute increase in mean income from incorporating the effects of ARRA was the 
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Notes: “2008-ARRA” represents the baseline revised to include the effects of ARRA. The percentage 
shares in aggregate income in 2007 were as follows: top quintile–49.6 percent; fourth quintile–23.7 
percent; third quintile–14.8 percent; second quintile–8.6 percent; and bottom quintile–3.6 percent. 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
 
Given the demographic differences that we observed earlier regarding the effects 
of earnings growth under ARRA, it is useful to examine how much of the favorable 
change in earnings translates into differential growth in household income (relative to the 
baseline) among groups of households (table 8). Consistent with our findings regarding 
the likely effects on earnings, we find that household income growth under ARRA is 
likely to favor nonwhites as opposed to whites. There does not appear to be much 
difference in expected income growth among households in different educational groups, 
except for college graduates who are estimated to receive a lower boost in household 
income—a finding that mirrors our earlier finding that the mean earnings of college 
graduates are likely to be lower with the ARRA jobs. Families headed by single females 
are likely to experience a higher income growth than married-couple families, again a   27
probable result of the expected higher earnings growth for females relative to males 
under ARRA. 
 
Table 8. Change in Mean Household Income Relative to the Baseline by 
Demographic Groups (in percent) 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
The expected movements in money income generated by the ARRA generally 
appear to favor the groups usually considered as disadvantaged. However, the likely size 
of the movements is bound to make no appreciable dent in the substantial disparities in 
money income that exist between the groups (figure 8). Nonwhite households continue to 
gather an annual income that is 28 percent less than that of white households. Almost no 
change is visible in the income disadvantage faced by households headed by individuals 
who are not college graduates. Those with less than a high school education receive an 
annual income that is only 31 percent of that of college graduates; for high school 
graduates and those with some college education, the comparable percentages are, 
respectively, 48 and 60. The gap between single–female headed families and married 
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Less than 25 Years 1.8
25 to 60 Years 1.1
60 Years and Older 0.8
D. Family Type
Married Couple 1.0
Single-female Head 1.3  28
Figure 8. The Effect of ARRA on Disparities in Money Income among Selected 
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Notes: “2008-ARRA” represents the baseline revised to include the effects of ARRA. 






Our aim was to provide an appraisal of the effect of ARRA on the distribution of 
household income. The only channel of influence that we analyzed was the employment 
channel, i.e., the additional employment created by ARRA, the likely earnings of the 
newly employed individuals, and the changes in household income stemming from the 
additional earnings. Such an exercise is a comparative-static exercise, i.e., it ignores other 
changes in economic conditions that are bound to affect employment, earnings, and 
income. It is also, by its very nature, speculative. We have attempted to ground our 
speculations on what appears to us as the best available information and methods, but it is 
quite likely that several of the estimates presented here will be revised in the future as 
better information becomes available. 
   29
Our estimates of job creation by the ARRA over the period 2009–2011 under four 
scenarios fell in the range of 6.1 to 8.8 million jobs. Quite fortuitously, two of our 
scenarios produced an estimate that was virtually identical to the estimate of 6.2 million 
jobs made by the Council of Economic Advisors. Given that the decline in employment 
since the onset of the current recession until March 2009 amounted to 6.5 million and that 
further job losses appear to be certain during the period of projection, we concluded that 
the job creation effect of ARRA is primarily a (partial) replacement of lost jobs. If borne 
out, this would surely be a welcome development for millions of Americans struggling to 
find a job. However, millions who could work would still be left out from productive 
employment, resulting in substantial economic hardship, as well as human and social 
costs.
24 
We estimate that the likely impact of ARRA on median household money income 
will be remedial. It might offset the decline that we think has occurred in 2008. While 
this might temper middle class income woes, it is unlikely to restore any semblance of 
robustness to middle class incomes. The level of median household income in 2007 was 
1.3 percent below the level attained in 1999. While the magnitudes differ, this finding 
holds for the bottom two quintiles also—their average money income after incorporating 
the effects of ARRA is likely to be lower than in 1999 and 2000. In sum, the bottom 60 
percent of households are unlikely to see any notable improvement in their money 
income as a result of ARRA. As for the top two quintiles, it seems that they are unlikely 
to suffer any setbacks in their relative or absolute income. Finally, we found that it is 
unlikely that the ARRA will have any palpable effect on redressing the substantial gaps 
in money income that exist between nonwhites and whites, single–female headed families 
and married couples, and less-educated and college graduates. 
Our analysis points toward the necessity of a comprehensive employment strategy 
that goes well beyond the ARRA. The need for public provisioning of various sorts 
(ranging from early childhood education centers to public health facilities to “greening” 
of public transportation), coupled with the severe underutilization of labor naturally 
                                                 
24  This job creation is roughly one-quarter of the size of the employable pool of workers in January 2009 
(28 million), or our best estimate of the potential pool of workers in 2011 (23.5 million) (includes CBO’s 
baseline unemployment and an estimate of involuntary part-time workers and marginally attached 
workers).   30
suggests an expanded role for public employment as a desirable ingredient of an 
alternative strategy. 
Government policies and priorities have to be radically refashioned to place the 
country on a sustainable and equitable growth path. The unfolding logic of the current 
crisis should be seen as an opportunity to push for a different set of institutional and 
economic arrangements that put people before profits. As history has shown, the required 
momentum for such a transformation is unlikely to come from the benevolence of rulers 
alone—irrespective of how well intentioned they might be. It can only come through 
popular mobilization and collective action.   31
APPENDIX A. STATE FISCAL STABILIZATION AND STATE FISCAL RELIEF  
 
The results presented in the main text are based on the assumption that the fiscal stimulus 
imparted by ARRA excludes the funds in the Act for ameliorating the projected shortfalls 
in state and local budgets. We made this assumption because our framework is purely 
designed to assess the impact of ARRA on employment and income relative to, 
respectively, January 2009 and calendar year 2008. In a fully articulated macroeconomic 
model that includes the expected reductions in aggregate demand due to the fiscal 
contraction at the subnational level, it is necessary to also include the funds set aside in 
the Act that could play a compensating role. The estimates of job creation by the 
administration and the CBO (see figure 1, main text) are based on including the latter 
amount in the fiscal stimulus. Our aim in this appendix is to present, purely for 
illustrative purposes, how the key estimates of the changes in employment and median 
household income presented in the main text of the report would be altered as a result of 
including the funds in the fiscal stimulus.
25 
 
Table 2A. Fiscal Stimulus with State Fiscal Funds (2009–2011) 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
With the addition of the funds, the size of the fiscal stimulus for 2009–2011 
increases from approximately $531 to $672 billion, or by 26 percent (table 2A; note that 
the tables and figures in the appendix are numbered so as to facilitate easy comparison 
                                                 





Outlays and tax cuts 530,964 79.1%
Outlays 241,376 35.9%
Purchases of goods and services 119,519 17.8%
Transfers to persons and subsidies 121,857 18.1%
Tax cuts 289,588 43.1%
State Fiscal Stabilization Fund 50,987 7.6%
State Fiscal Relief 89,651 13.3%
TOTAL 671,602 100.0%  32
with those in the main text. Table 2A in the appendix can be compared with table 2 in the 
main text, etc.). Much of the increase is due to the increased Medicaid funding (State 
Fiscal Relief). We treated this as a form of general aid by the federal government to state 
and local governments, and assumed it to have a multiplier of 1.9 (“high”) or 1.3 
(“medium”). The remainder of the increase is mainly due to the enhanced funding for 
public education (State Fiscal Stabilization). We considered this as an increase in the 
final demand for the government industries in the input-output table, consistent with our 
approach to government purchases of goods and services.
26 
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As we would expect, the additional employment resulting from ARRA is higher 
when State Fiscal Funds are included in the fiscal stimulus (figure 3A).
27 In fact, the 
                                                 
26 In comparison, Romer and Bernstein (2009) treated State Fiscal Relief by assuming only 60 percent is 
used to increase government purchases. The remaining is allocated between prevention of tax increases (30 
percent) and of states’ withdrawal from their rainy day funds (10 percent), which are assumed to occur in 
their baseline calculation. 
27 We include here only the estimates under the “government” assumption regarding the final demand 
generated by government purchases because the “private” assumption generates very similar results.   33
increase in employment relative to when State Fiscal Funds are excluded in the fiscal 
stimulus is, in percentage terms, similar to the increase that occurs in the size of the fiscal 
stimulus when State Fiscal Funds are included—approximately 25 percent. The cost per 
job created by the State Fiscal Funds was about 9 percent lower than the cost associated 
with the outlays included in the main text. The slightly lower cost can be explained by the 
difference in the mix of transfers and government purchases: the outlays included in the 
analysis are almost equally split between the two, while transfers make up about two-
thirds of the State Fiscal Funds. In line with other models, our model also features a 
higher employment multiplier for transfers than government purchases. 
In comparison with the employment situation at the start of the recession, the 
high-end estimate of employment generated by the ARRA with State Fiscal Funds was 
about 0.03 percent higher and the low-end estimate was 0.01 percent higher. Given that 
further job losses are likely during the period of projection, we think it is reasonable to 
maintain roughly the same conclusion arrived in the main text: the effect of ARRA on 
aggregate employment will be mostly (a partial) replacement of lost employment. 
 


















Notes: 2008-ARRA represents the estimate shown in the main text (figure 5); 2008-ARRA1 represents the 
estimate with fiscal funds included and high values assumed for multipliers; 2008-ARRA2 represents the 
estimate with fiscal funds included and medium values assumed for multipliers. 
Source: Authors’ calculations   34
The higher level of employment resulting from the inclusion of State Fiscal Funds 
will, as one would expect, boost household income, relative to the situation when fiscal 
funds were excluded, via increasing the amount of earnings assigned to the newly 
employed. This expectation is confirmed in the results shown in figure 6A. If we include 
all the State Fiscal Funds and assume high values for employment multipliers, median 
household income will be 3.3 percent higher than in the baseline (bar labeled “2008-
ARRA1”). In this case, the forecasted decline in 2008 will be overcome fully and 
household income will return to a level that is 0.5 percent higher than in 1999. Under the 
less unrealistic assumption of medium values for employment multipliers, median 
household income will be about 2.3 percent higher than in the baseline and 0.5 percent 
lower than in 1999.  35
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